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Abstract 
The services acquisition volume in the US Department of Defense (DoD) has 
continued to increase in scope and dollars in the past decade.  Between FY 1999 to 
FY 2003, DoD’s spending on services increased by 66%, and in FY 2003, the DoD 
spent over $118 billion (or approximately 57% of total DoD procurement dollars) on 
services.  In recent years, the DoD has spent more on services than on supplies, 
equipment and goods, even considering the high value of weapon systems and 
large military items.  These services belong to a very broad set of activities, ranging 
from grounds maintenance to space launch operations.  The major categories 
include professional, administrative, and management support; construction, repair, 
and maintenance of facilities and equipment; information technology; research and 
development, and medical care. 
As the DoD’s services acquisition volume continues to increase in scope and 
dollars, the agency must pay greater attention to proper acquisition planning, 
adequate requirements definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor 
oversight.  In many ways, these are the same issues affecting the acquisition of 
physical supplies and weapon systems.  However, the unique characteristics of 
services and the increasing importance of services acquisition offer a significant 
opportunity for conducting research in the management of the service supply chain 
in the Department of Defense. 
The objectives of the exploratory research presented in the paper are to (1) 
analyze the size, structure and trends in the DoD’s service supply chain, (2) 
understand the challenges faced by contracting officers, program managers and 
end-users in services acquisition, (3) develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding and analyzing the supply chain in services, and (4) provide policy 
recommendations that can lead to more effective and efficient management of the 
DoD’s spending on services.  In addition to the analysis of service acquisition-related 
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site visits and interviews at Navy, Army and Air Force bases..  Addressing issues 
related to both theory and practice, this paper makes a modest contribution towards 
more effective and efficient management of service acquisition in the Department of 
Defense. 
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I. Introduction 
The DoD’s services acquisition volume has continued to increase in scope 
and dollars in the past decade.  Between FY 1999 to FY 2003, the DoD’s spending 
on services increased by 66%, and in FY 2003, the DoD spent over $118 billion (or 
approximately 57% of total DoD procurement dollars) on services (GAO, 2005a).  In 
recent years, the DoD has spent more on services than on supplies, equipment and 
goods, even considering the high value of weapon systems and large military items  
(Levy,D.G., Moini, J.S., Kaganoff, T., Keating, E.G.,  Augustine, C.H., 
Bikson, T. K.,  Leuschner, K.J., & Gates, S.M., 2004).  These services belong 
to very broad set of activities, ranging from grounds maintenance to space launch 
operations.  The major categories include professional, administrative, and 
management support; construction, repair, and maintenance of facilities and 
equipment; information technology; research and development, and medical care. 
As the DoD’s services acquisition volume continues to increase in scope and 
dollars, the agency must pay greater attention to proper acquisition planning, 
adequate requirements definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor 
oversight (GAO, 2002a).  In many ways, these are the same issues affecting the 
acquisition of physical supplies and weapon systems.  However, there are important 
differences between the production, acquisition and delivery of services and 
manufactured goods.  For example, services cannot be inventoried, require 
customer contact and joint production, and have customer-specific inputs.  
Moreover, we observe intangibility in varying degrees, which makes it difficult to 
evaluate the quality and performance of a service operation (Karmarkar & Pitbladdo, 
1995).  The unique characteristics of services and the increasing importance of 
services acquisition offer a significant opportunity for conducting research in the 
management of the service supply chain in the Department of Defense. 
The purpose of this research is, therefore, to conduct an initial exploratory 
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acquisition environment.  Our research contributes to both the theory and practice of 
service acquisition in the Federal Government. Theoretical contributions include the 
development of a conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing the supply 
chain in services, based on rigorous literature in operations management, logistics, 
public policy, budgeting and microeconomics.  We expect that the knowledge 
developed herein will lead to more effective and efficient management of the 
Department of Defense acquisition of services. 
This exploratory research effort consists of a review of the service acquisition 
practices in the Department of Defense.  It includes visits to a sample of DoD 
installations involved in the acquisition of services, with interviews of contracting 
officers, program managers, and other personnel at these installations. 
The literature review focuses on secondary sources such as government 
reports, defense acquisition-related periodicals and journals, as well as other 
scholarly and practitioner-oriented journals and periodicals dealing with service 
operations, outsourcing and contracting. 
The DoD installation visits were planned to cover a sample of Army, Navy, 
and Air Force installations.  Thus far, we have visited Travis AFB and the Presidio of 
Monterey and have visits to the Naval bases in San Diego planned in the near 
future.  These DoD installations have outsourced significant operation-support 
services and provide an excellent source for analysis.  During these visits, we 
explored the following research questions: 
1. What types of base operations services are typically procured at 
military installations? 
2. How is the outsourcing decision made in services acquisition? 
3. How are these services acquired (what type of acquisition strategy and 
procurement method is used?)? 
4. What are the challenges in procuring base operations-support 
services, from both business (acquisition, finance) and operational 
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5. What type of management structure is used to manage these service 
programs? 
6. What are the emerging trends in the policies and practices used in 
acquiring base operations services? 
This research paper is organized in six sections. This introductory section is 
followed by the second section dealing with the inherent characteristics of services 
and their implications to contracting.  We analyze the size and structure of the DoD’s 
service acquisition environment in the third section.  An overview of services 
contract management is also presented in this section.  The fourth section presents 
our analysis of the DoD’s policy and practices on contracting for services.  The 
information we gathered during our site visits is discussed in the fifth section.  The 
preliminary observations and conclusions of this exploratory research are given in 
the sixth and final section.  We wish to clarify that this is an ongoing research project 
with several activities such as additional base visits and interviews of contracting 
personnel and customers yet to be completed.  Hence, this paper should be viewed 
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II. Service Characteristics and Their Implications 
to Contracting 
Service production differs from manufacturing in several ways.  In many 
operations texts, the key issues that are identified include the intangibility of service 
output, the difficulty of portability, and complexity in the definition and measurement 
of services (for example, see Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2006).  To these we 
would also add the observation that services often involve joint production between 
the buyer and the supplier.  These characteristics create certain differences in the 
production and marketing of services.  For example, the joint production aspect 
means that the productive system is often not buffered from the customer.  The 
customer is often present and even participating in the production process, while 
simultaneously being a consumer.  The resulting need for "customer contact" has 
been analyzed in the seminal work of Chase (1981) to categorize different types of 
service firms and sectors. In this section, we examine the effect of some of the 
special characteristics of services on issues related to outsourcing of services and 
contracting for service delivery. 
A. Characteristics of Services 
There is a growing body of literature on operations management in service 
firms.  Special characteristics of service operations are discussed in textbooks such 
as Sasser, Olsen and Wyckoff (1978), Murdick, Render and Russell (1990), Heskett, 
Sasser and Hart (1990), Lovelock (1992), Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons (2006), and 
in casebooks including Sasser, Hart and Heskett (1991). 
Managing quality in service businesses, although similar in spirit to that in 
manufacturing, is somewhat different and is relatively more challenging due to 
certain inherent characteristics of service operations.  These include the intangibility 
of service outcome in some cases, and the presence and participation of customers 
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matching demand and supply since such output can't be inventoried.  This is, 
however, not meant to suggest that lack of inventory is a characteristic of services.  
In fact, as exemplified by a restaurant, managing inventory of supplies (termed as 
tangible goods by Sasser, Olsen and Wycoff (1978)) can be very critical to the 
success of a service enterprise. 
The diversity of services makes it difficult to come up with generalizations that 
are helpful for managers of service businesses. Lovelock (1983, Summer) proposes 
five schemes for classifying services that offer insight for marketing and operations 
managers in different service businesses.  Additional suggestions for managing 
service business are given by Lovelock (1992), Schmenner (1986, Spring), and 
Quinn (1992).   
Chase (1981), as mentioned previously, proposed a theory of the customer 
contact approach to services which holds that the services that entail high degree of 
customer contact have inherently smaller potential for efficiency due to the variability 
and uncertainty that customers introduce in the creation of service.  Apte and Mason 
(1995) propose that customer contact be conceptualized in two ways:  first, in terms 
of propinquity, or a physical presence, involving a face-to-face contact between the 
customer and service provider, and second, in terms of a symbolic contact: the main 
purpose of customer contact is to exchange the information necessary in service 
creation and consumption.  It should be noted that a service activity, in general, 
requires a combination of both types of customer contact.  With the progress of 
information technology, the symbolic portion of the contact is being increasingly 
automated using information technology.  In many cases, information technology is 
also being used for redefining, or reengineering, services. 
Closely related to the concept of customer contact is the service characteristic 
of co-production.  Not only do customers have a presence during the service-
creation process, but they may have significant tasks to perform as well.  Examples 
range from self service at gasoline stations and salad bars to the shared 
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(including tax preparation).  In some cases, the customer's participation in joint 
production is rather passive.  But in other cases, such as financial planning or 
education, the participation may be very active and very significant in determining 
the quality of service production.  Indeed, education is a major service sector for 
which an active role of the customer is absolutely critical.  In the prototypical 
manufacturing case, customers' roles start after production has been completed.  To 
the extent this is not the case—for example, custom production of manufactured 
goods with customer-provided blueprints—the manufacturing business takes on 
more of the character of a service. 
As mentioned earlier, many services have outputs that are intangible and are 
hard to measure (McLaughlin & Coffey, 1990).  For example, in services such as 
medical examinations or tax planning, output is quite intangible.  Output of sales 
transactions involving manufactured goods can be metered rather easily with 
respect to the quantities involved.  However, the delivered "quantity" of business 
consulting or medical services is rather more difficult to measure.  In such cases, it is 
difficult for the buyer and the vendor to easily agree on exactly what output has been 
supplied.  A serious confounding problem is that it is difficult to distinguish between 
the level of attributes of services and the quantity of services.  For example, it may 
be hard to say whether medical advice is more correct, more thorough, more 
considerate of the patient, or simply more.  
In textbook discussions of service operations, services are often described as 
being complex. A part of this complexity arises from the difficulties in measurement 
discussed above.  A second part arises from the joint production or custom 
character of many services, which, in turn, has two effects: First, the presence of the 
customer means the service process cannot be separated from service output.  The 
obvious consequence is a much larger set of attributes for customer evaluation.  
Moreover, the customer brings to the process a set of expectations, capabilities, as 
well as material inputs that are specific to that customer.  As a result, the "output" of 
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attributes.  Participation in the production process is, in itself, a complex issue with 
some internal costs but possibly some consumption value as well.  All these threads 
may be very difficult to untangle.  As an example, consider a class in a management 
course, with the students (possibly organized into groups) and instructors interacting 
in the course of a case discussion.  It is near impossible in practice to measure the 
educational output received by any one student in an objective way either in terms of 
quantity or attribute levels. 
The special features of services lead to significant differences in the process 
of production, sale and consumption of services.  These, in turn, have implications 
for market structure, pricing, and contracting for services.  Karmarkar and Pitbladdo 
(1992) present some key features regarding service contracting that are relevant to 
the development of a service quality model.  First and foremost, service operations 
are always post-contractual.  Fixed-price contracts centered on output specifications 
can fail on two accounts.  First is the difficulty of conceiving or verifying meaningful 
output specifications, and second is the variability of customer inputs and joint 
production which makes fixed-price contracts risky for the firm, even when the output 
specifications can be well defined.  Alternatively, contracts based on process 
specifications, such as time and materials, can turn out to be unsuitable since these 
can be risky for customers.  These dual risks for firms and for customers can be 
addressed via stage-wise or contingent contracting, in which the process is broken 
into stages, and the price for a given stage is made dependent on the outputs of 
previous stages.  For example, there may be a fixed fee for a diagnosis, and a fixed 
fee for treatment which, however, depends on the outcome of the diagnosis.  The 
uncertainty in customer inputs is resolved by the diagnosis before it materializes in 
terms of treatment cost. 
B. Service Quality 
Corporate experience indicates that customer satisfaction and high service 
quality leads to greater long-term profitability (Buzzell & Gale, 1987).  The topic of 
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decades.  Deming (1985) and Crosby (1979) are notable examples of practitioner 
viewpoints on quality management.  Gronroos’ study (1982) is one of the early 
research papers that explicitly dealt with service quality.  Adopting a customer's 
viewpoint, service quality is conceptualized by Parasuraman, Berry and Zeithaml 
(1985, Fall) as the difference between the service-quality expectations of a customer 
and the quality of service delivery performance as perceived by a customer.  A 
detailed discussion of their service-quality model and the associated survey 
instrument, SERVQUAL, can be found in their 1990 text.  Other research literature 
on service quality includes comprehensive collections of readings such as Bowen, 
Chase & Cummings (1990), Brown, Gummesson, Edvardsson & Gustavsson (1991), 
and Lovelock (1992).  Chase and Bowen (1991) discuss service quality issues in 
terms of three elements of service delivery system: technology, systems and people.  
Apte, Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1996) provide a new framework for measuring and 
improving service quality. Additionally, in discussing the measurement and 
management of service quality, Collier (1990) examines the issues of definitions, 
standards and measurement, monitoring and control of service quality. 
The main conclusions of these papers are: 
• Customers find it more difficult to evaluate the quality of service than the 
quality of goods. 
• Customer evaluation of service quality involves comparison of a 
customer's expectations with actual service performance. 
• Service quality evaluations are based on the outcome of a service as 
well as on the process of service delivery. 
C. Service Characteristics and their Implications for 
Contracting 
Intangibility of service outcomes makes it difficult to clearly describe and 
quantify services and, therefore, to contract for services. Consider, for example, the 
difficulty in writing a contact for an educational service involving academic lectures.  
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contract is fulfilled satisfactorily?  As Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1995) explain, this is 
the reason why in such cases we do not contract around quantities at all; rather we 
contract around process delivery.  In general, the more information-intensive the 
service is, the more difficult it is to develop clear and meaningful contracts.   This 
difficulty is somewhat reduced in services in which physical objects play a dominant 
role. 
Intangibility of outputs also makes it difficult to define and measure quality.  
For example, even for a simple custodial service such as cleaning, it is not easy to 
define the desired level of cleanliness. The levels of cleaning needed for an office is 
certainly different than for a hospital operating room.  The desired time duration for 
maintaining a clean status can also be an important matter in writing a contract for 
cleaning service.  As research in service quality has found, customers typically 
evaluate the quality of service based on the outcome of a service as well as on the 
customer’s experience with the process of service delivery.  For example, in a dining 
facility, not only must the food be tasty but the manner in which the food is served 
must also be courteous, prompt and friendly.  This means that the contracts for 
many services should not be based solely on outcomes but should include 
specifications on both the outcome and the customer’s experience with the process.   
Co-production requiring presence and participation of customers in the 
creation of many services is an important characteristic of services.  For example, in 
an IT service such as software development, a customer’s input in terms of desired 
specifications of a software system is critically important.  For example, however 
competent the software developer may be, the developed software will not be 
satisfactory if the specifications do not accurately reflect the true needs of the 
customer.  Hence, the contracts for services should ideally specify not only what the 
service provider should do but also what the customer should do.  Otherwise, a 
satisfactory service outcome may not be realized. 
Diversity of Services also makes it difficult and undesirable to use the same 
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differences in medical services versus custodial services, it is important that the 
contracts for these services are customized to suit the lifecycle needs of individual 
services. 
Finally, services are complex and may involve multi-stage processes.  This 
makes it important, yet challenging, to write contracts that are flexible enough to 
cover all relevant scenarios and eventualities.  Moreover, if such contract cannot be 
satisfactorily defined, it may be desirable to deliver certain services using internal 
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III. Size and Structure of the DoD’s Services 
Acquisition Environment 
The DoD’s procurement process is currently undergoing a transformation 
similar to the one experienced by private enterprises. This transformation is 
changing how the agency manages its procurement function, including its people, 
processes, practices, and policies. The DoD’s procurement function is currently 
transforming from a transaction-oriented perspective to a strategic-oriented 
organization.  No longer viewed as a tactical, clerical, or administrative function, the 
procurement function is gaining enhanced status as leading organizations 
understand its importance in achieving strategic objectives and its impact on 
competitive advantage. Specifically, the procurement transformation is taking place 
in three major areas: “moving from buying goods to buying services, moving from a 
command and control relationship to a partnering relationship between the 
government and contractors, and moving from a paper-based procurement system 
to electronic procurement” (Abramson & Harris, 2003).  This research paper focuses 
primarily on the first transformation area: services acquisition. 
The transformation from buying goods to buying services is considered the 
driving force behind the procurement revolution.  Gansler describes this 
transformation as a reflection of the changing role of the government from that of a 
“provider of goods” to that of a “manager of the providers of good and service” 
(2003).  In addition, the method of procuring services is also changing.  Traditionally, 
through the Request for Proposal (RFP), the government would dictate what the 
contractor was to do and how to do it.  Through the use of detailed specifications 
and requirements, the contractor was directed how to perform the contracted effort.  
The procurement transformation is changing how the RFP is being developed. RFPs 
are now being written to communicate the performance objectives or end-results of 
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These two driving forces, the change in what the government is buying 
(services) and how the government is buying (performance-based contracts), is 
resulting in the government procuring solutions and knowledge, as opposed to 
specific supplies or standardized services (2003). 
A. Growth and Scope of DoD Service Contracts 
The federal government is the largest purchaser in the world: every 20 
seconds of each business day the federal government awards a contract with an 
average value of $465,000 (Stanberry, 2001).  In Fiscal Year 2004, federal 
government procurement spending totaled approximately $328 billion.  Of that 
amount, approximately $99 billion was spent by the civilian agencies, with the 
remaining $228 billion spent by the Department of Defense (Federal Procurement 
Data System, 2004).  Furthermore, the Department of Defense is the federal 
government’s largest purchaser of services.  As illustrated in Figure 1, since FY 
1999, the DoD’s spending on services has increased by 66%, to over $118 billion in 
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Compared to other contract categories, the expenditure in services is the 
largest single spend category in the Federal Government.  Figure 2 reflects the 
growth of services contracts in relation to the other contract categories.  Between FY 
1990 and 2000, procurement for services grew from $70 billion to $87 billion, yet the 
procurement of supplies and equipment decreased from $102 billion to $77 billion in 













Figure 2.  Federal Contract Spending 
(GAO, 2001b) 
Moreover, Figure 3 compares the procurement of services with the 
procurement of goods during the period between FY 1998 and FY 2002 in the 




























Figure 3. The DoD's Contracts for Goods and Services 
(GAO, 2003b) 
The DoD procures a variety of services in support of its mission.  These 
services range from traditional commercial contracts such as IT support, custodial 
services, and grounds maintenance, to mission-related services such as aircraft and 
engine maintenance, and initial pilot training.  Figure 4 shows the major categories 
of services procured by the DoD and their values; we see that Professional, 
Administrative, and Management Support, and Construction, Repair and 
Maintenance of Structure and Facilities are the types of services most often 






















































Figure 4.  Services Purchased by the DoD in FY 2000 
(GAO, 2002a) 
We identified specific examples of these various services during recent visits 
at military installations in the central and northern California area.  For example, at 
the Presidio of Monterey, an Army installation providing support services to the 
Defense Language Institute and the Ord Military Community, the Army contracts for 
base operations support, grounds maintenance, custodial services, and dining 
facilities services, among other contracts (Auernig, 2006).   
At Travis Air Force Base, a major Air Mobility Command (AMC) base, these 
same types of services are procured, as well as several mission-unique services 
such as transient alert services for the flight-line operations, passenger screening for 
the airfield passenger terminal, and falconry services in support of the Bird Aircraft 
Strike Hazard (BASH) program.  In addition, Travis AFB also provides contracting 
support to the David Grant USAF Medical Center.  In this capacity, Travis AFB 
procures various medical services such as medical transcription, nurse services, 
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B. Services Contract Management—an Overview 
The management of the DoD’s services contracts typically follows the 
traditional contract-management process.  This contracting process consists of the 
following phases:  procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source 
selection, contract administration, and contract closeout as illustrated in Figure 5 
(Garrett & Redon, 2005).  Each of these contracting phases will be discussed, along 
with key practice activities.   
Figure 5.  The Procurement Process 
Procurement planning is the first contracting phase and involves identifying 
which business needs can be best met by procuring products or services outside the 
organization. This process involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, 
what to procure, how much to procure, and when to procure.  Key practice activities 
included within the procurement planning phase include determining the initial scope 
of work or the description of the product in the acquisition, conducting market 
research to analyze the level of technologies and types of products and services 
available in the marketplace, determining funds availability, and developing initial 
cost and schedule estimates as well as manpower resources.  Developing an initial 
Statement of Work (SOW) and Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) are also included 
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contract-type selection, risk management, and an initial analysis of potential contract 
terms and conditions is also part of the procurement planning process (Garrett & 
Redon, 2005).  It should be noted that many of the contractual documents 
developed in the procurement planning phase are initial draft documents, such as 
SOWs, WBSs, project scope statements, and funding and manpower estimates.  
These are initial draft documents simply because they are typically modified and 
revised as the acquisition program office becomes more knowledgeable of the 
business and technical aspects of the program.  Industry business and technical 
knowledge are typically acquired through the use of market research activities, 
industry conferences, and Requests for Information (RFIs). 
The second phase of the procurement process is solicitation planning, 
which involves the process of preparing the solicitation documents needed to 
support the acquisition. This is a critical phase of the procurement process since it is 
during this phase that the work statements, specifications and other exhibits, 
standard terms and conditions, as well as special contract requirements are 
developed, revised, and finalized.  Key practice activities within the solicitation 
planning process include using standard procurement forms and documents such as 
solicitation templates, model contracts, specifications and item descriptions, 
solicitation provisions, and contract terms and conditions (2005). 
Solicitation is the third phase of the procurement process and is the process 
of obtaining bids and proposals from prospective sellers on how to meet the 
objectives of the project.  The solicitation phase is critical to the overall acquisition 
strategy because it is this phase that executes the procurement planning strategy for 
a full and open competition or sole-source procurement.  Some key practice 
activities within the Solicitation phase include conducting market research and 
advertising to identify new sources of supplies and services for the purpose of 
developing a list of interested offerors (Garrett & Redon, 2005).  These offerors will 
receive the solicitation requesting the proposal.  Another key practice activity in the 
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to ensure that all prospective contractors have a clear, common understanding of 
the technical and contractual requirements of the acquisition (2005). 
Source selection is the fourth phase of the contracting process and involves 
receiving proposals and applying evaluation criteria to select the contractor.  Key 
practice activities within the source-selection process include using evaluation 
criteria focusing on management, technical, and cost, tailoring the basis for award to 
either lowest cost/technically acceptable or best value. In evaluating proposals, the 
Program Manager must also take into consideration an offeror’s past performance 
(2005). 
Contract administration is the fifth phase of the contracting process and 
entails managing the relationship with the contractor and ensuring that each party’s 
performance meets the contract requirements.  During contract administration, the 
government’s focus is on managing the contractor’s cost, schedule, and 
performance.  Key practice activities within the contract administration process 
include using an integrated team approach for monitoring the contractor’s cost, 
schedule, and performance, and having an established process for administering 
incentive and award-fee provisions (2005).  These incentives and award fees are 
tools used to motivate the contractor to meet specific performance standards. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) identifies two major contract 
categories: cost reimbursement contracts and fixed-price contracts, depending on 
the method of compensation due to the contractor.  In the fixed-price category, the 
contractor agrees to provide specified supplies or services in return for a specified 
price, either a lump sum or a unit price.  The price is fixed and is not subject to 
change regardless of the contractor’s actual cost experience.  Only if the contract is 
modified is the price subject to change (Garrett & Redon, 2005).  There are various 
types of fixed-priced contracts such as Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Fixed Price with 
Economic Price Adjustment (FP-EPA), and Fixed Priced Incentive (FPI).  In the cost-
reimbursement contract category, the contractor agrees to provide a best effort in 
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broad specifications.  In return, the contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs 
up to the amount specified in the contract.  Among cost reimbursement contracts we 
find Cost Sharing (CS), Cost Plus Fixed Fee, (CPFF), Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
(CPIF), and Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF). 
The final phase of the contracting process is contract closeout, the process 
of verifying that all administrative matters are concluded on a physically complete 
contract.  This involves accepting final deliveries, making final payment to the 
contractor, as well as completing and settling the contract and resolving any open 
items.  Key practice activities within the contract closeout phase include using 
checklists and forms for ensuring proper documentation of closed contracts and 
maintaining a “lessons learned and best practices” database for use in future 
contracts and projects (2005). An important aspect of closing out the contract is 
conducting a final evaluation of the contractor’s performance in terms of meeting 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  This final contractor evaluation will be 
used in future contract competitions and source selections.  The contract closeout 
phase is often forgotten and has been considered an administrative burden or 
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IV. DoD Policy on Contracting for Services 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the DoD has seen a steady growth in the 
volume, complexity and value of service contracts.  Some of this growth results from 
an increase in the level of operations, some of it from the replacement of the civilian 
workforce by contractors, and some is a result of government policy dictating 
maximum use of contractors. 
Compared with other federal agencies, the Department of Defense is often 
viewed as being particularly aggressive in complying with the Office of Management 
and Budget’s Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities.  The Circular 
directs that the “longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on 
the private sector for needed commercial activities.”  A commercial activity is defined 
as, “a recurring service that could be performed by the private sector and is 
resourced, performed, and controlled by the [government] agency through 
performance by government personnel, a contract, or a fee-for-service agreement” 
(OMB, 2003). 
Accompanying this growth in outsourcing activity has been a downsizing of 
the DoD civilian and military acquisition workforce, which is responsible for 
administering these contracts.  Also, Congress has mandated a shift to 
Performance-based Service Acquisition (PBSA).  PBSA is intended to obtain higher 
levels of contractor performance at lower cost, and promote a partnership-oriented, 
long-term approach that allows the government—and the DoD in particular—to 
benefit from commercial best practices (US Air Force, 2005; DoD Office of Inspector 
General, 2003; Federal Acquisition Council, 2006). 
It is of interest that Circular A-76 mandates that, while actual performance of 
an activity may be outsourced, control remains with the government agency no 
matter what decision is ultimately made as a result of a competition between in-
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The complexity of the monitoring process and the nature of the services 
outsourced make this contradiction even more difficult to live with.  A sanguine, yet 
now somewhat dated view of agencies’ overall management challenges, has been 
provided by the DoD Inspector General: 
The seven audit reports that I am bringing to your attention today have a 
common theme, which is that eleven years of workforce downsizing, without 
proportionate workload reductions or productivity increases, have created or 
exacerbated mission performance problems across a wide spectrum of DoD 
organizations and civilian personnel specialties.  In an age when 
organizational agility is the watchword for successful businesses, DoD has 
been anything but agile, when it comes to managing human capital. This is 
partially due to restrictive personnel management laws and regulations, but 
also to previous reluctance to innovate and lack of strategic planning 
regarding the civilian workforce. (2001) 
In transaction cost analysis (Williamson, 1983), a distinction is made between 
the cost of delivering the service (“production” costs) and the cost of managing the 
relationship between the buyer and seller (“transaction” costs).  Circular A-76 directs 
a decision based entirely on production costs while remaining silent on transaction 
costs.  Yet, from the point of view of both the taxpayer and the mission, the total cost 
should perhaps be the deciding factor. 
The issue of “control” (also referred as a synonym to “oversight” or 
“surveillance”) transcends that of cost.  The government agency that has outsourced 
the activity may simply not have access to the necessary personnel or budget to 
adequately exercise this control.  Williamson emphasizes that, traditionally, a 
hierarchical (in-house) arrangement has lower transaction costs because it is easier 
to direct one’s own employee to perform an activity.  In contrast, specialist firms may 
have lower production costs because of experience or some type of economies of 
scale.  The challenge for government is to equitably consider all these factors when 
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A. The Challenge of Outsourcing Services 
Traditionally, DoD contracting practice has been focused on goods, not 
services.  This is in spite of the fact that services now account to over 55% of the 
dollar volume of DoD contracts (DoD Office of the Inspector General, 2005).  A 
similar trend has been observed in other federal agencies (GAO, 2005c).  Congress 
has mandated, through the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002, an improved 
management of the service contracting process (GAO, 2005a). 
Outsourcing services on a large scale poses unique challenges for the DoD.  
The Department’s employees, both those officially part of the “acquisition workforce” 
and those otherwise involved in the services acquisition process, are the focal point 
of any effort to increase the quantity and quality of outsourcing.  Yet at the same 
time, the numbers of those employees have been falling rapidly; it is not 
unreasonable to claim that, in many cases, the necessary numbers of staff or skills 
are not present to ensure the adequate monitoring of the increased scale. 
The DoD has a responsibility to act as a “knowledgeable client” for the nation 
in its relationship with the private sector.  As a knowledgeable client, its employees 
must be in a position to maintain a number of capabilities, including the following: 
1. An understanding of what services may or should be outsourced, 
2. An awareness of the capabilities and limitations of private-sector firms 
in the appropriate area, 
3. The ability to tender for and competently evaluate competing bids from 
both private-sector firms, 
4. Where a service currently provided in-house is being considered for 
outsourcing, the ability to evaluate competing bids from in-house and 
private sources according to the complex requirements set by the 
Office of Management and Budget, and 
5. The ongoing ability to develop, maintain, and improve the surveillance 
of contracted activity to ensure that value is being obtained, and to 
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All of the above require an appropriate number of skilled personnel in a wide 
variety of fields.  Expertise is needed in both contracting per se and in the technical 
or functional area that is being outsourced.  Where outsourcing is viewed as a way 
to reduce government headcount (particularly that of civilian personnel), those 
remaining in the job need to have higher levels of expertise to carry out adequate 
surveillance of each contracted activity.  The GAO has emphasized the importance 
of improvements in monitoring (or “surveillance”) of DoD service contracts: 
According to DOD officials, insufficient surveillance occurred because 
surveillance is not as important to contracting officials as awarding contracts 
and therefore, does not receive the priority needed to ensure that surveillance 
occurs. […] Further, surveillance was usually a part-time responsibility and 
some personnel felt that they did not have enough time in a normal workday 
to perform their surveillance duties. (GAO, 2005a) 
Another GAO study concurs with the above. It explains: 
Addressing human capital issues in acquisition is not just a matter of the size 
of the workforce. It is also a capacity issue. While acquisition reforms have 
helped streamline smaller acquisitions, larger acquisitions, particularly for 
information technology, remain complex and technical. Yet agencies are at 
risk of not having enough of the right people with the right skills to manage 
these procurements. Consequently, a critical issue the federal government 
faces is whether it has today, or will have tomorrow, the ability to manage the 
procurement of increasingly sophisticated services. (GAO, 2001a) 
That such phenomena should occur is perhaps a natural outcome of the 
contradictory forces at work in outsourcing activities.  While the emphasis is on 
reducing in-house personnel, outsourcing in itself may require a targeted increase in 
the number of government employees, as well as some change in their 
qualifications, to ensure that outsourcing is carried out according to regulations in a 
cost-effective, “best value” manner. 
The Air Force represents an example of an effective approach to the need for 
up-front planning of the in-house personnel requirements associated with 
outsourcing, as well as the inherently interdisciplinary mix of government personnel 
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Force experience illustrates the difficulties of considering potential or actual contract 
management costs as part of the outsourcing decision.   
A RAND study of 22 PBSA-inspired contracts at 15 Air Force bases 
concluded that information on the internal costs of outsourcing was “highly 
impressionistic” and that data on quality assurance costs, which should theoretically 
decline with a switch to PBSA, were ambiguous (Ausink, Camm & Cannon, 2001).  
Even the actual expenditures on contracts were difficult to calculate and evaluate 
within the agency: 
DOD is in the early stages of a spend analysis pilot. Although DOD is moving 
in the right direction, it has not yet adopted best practices to the same extent 
as the companies we studied. Whether DOD can adopt these practices 
depends on its ability to make long-term changes necessary to implement a 
more strategic approach to contracting. DOD also cites a number of 
challenges, such as its large and complex need for a range of services, the 
fragmentation of spending data across multiple information systems, and 
contracting goals for small businesses that may constrain its ability to 
consolidate smaller requirements into larger contracts. Challenges such as 
these are difficult and deep-rooted, but companies also faced them. For DOD 
to change management practices for the contracting of services will require 
sustained executive leadership at DOD as well as the involvement and 
support of Congress. (GAO, 2003a) 
Given the difficulties of capturing costs at many levels and for different 
activities, it is perhaps not surprising that the DoD also suffers from major challenges 
in personnel management. 
B. The “Human Capital” Issue 
It is somewhat ironic, but not at all unexpected, that the downsizing of the 
DoD civilian workforce, and the increasing emphasis on moving military personnel 
into deployable positions, has resulted in increased concerns about who is minding 
the store. In its government-wide review of the acquisition function, the GAO 
emphasizes “human capital” as a “cornerstone” for an effective acquisition 
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“Integration and Alignment” should form part of “Strategic Human Capital Planning” 
(GAO, 2005c). 
The emphasis on “Integration and Alignment” is particularly salient for the 
DoD.  What is being implied is that the in-house workforce needs to be developed 
and maintained in a manner commensurate with the workload requirements created 
by outsourcing.  In an analysis of the Air Force’s PBSA activities based on 
commercial practices for outsourcing of installation management, RAND noted that 
government personnel should have the ability to: 
• describe what service is desired and not how to perform the work, 
• use measurable performance standards and quality assurance plans, 
• specify procedures for reductions in fee or price when services do not 
meet contract requirements, and 
• include performance incentives where appropriate. (Baldwin & Hunter, 
2004) 
Yet Baldwin and Hunter also emphasize in the same report the need for more 
sophisticated statements of requirement, refinement and reduction of performance 
metrics, and, notably, widespread participation in the services contracting process.  
Such participation necessarily requires time and the application of expertise by 
qualified people.  Particularly in an era of downsizing and with an aging workforce, 
recruiting and retaining suitable civil service personnel is a difficult process.  
Meanwhile, the military services must “grow their own” personnel in a closed 
environment that usually begins at the recruiting station and balance a complex mix 
of occupational specialties, ranks, and attrition rates with the added complication of 
deployments that are impossible to forecast. 
The FAR and other contracting regulations impose a host of responsibilities, 
such as those discussed above, on acquisition and other government personnel for 
the entire service’s contracting lifecycle.  Not only must the agency head ensure that 
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Acquisition Council, 2006).  However, the policy-making agencies responsible for 
contracting rules have little connection to the organizations who set budgets or who 
assign qualified people to the positions required to develop or monitor the contracts 
that result from those contracting rules. 
In the private sector, this lack of communication may be less of a barrier, 
given the common sense of purpose imposed by the pursuit of profit (Balwin & 
Hunter, 2004).  However, it is reasonable to state that increased contracting and 
decreased surveillance could lead to reduced quality performance.  Some of the 
more extreme examples of this divergence in direction that have already led to 
widespread media attention include insufficient monitoring of contracts in Iraq by the 
DoD, the Department of State, and other federal agencies (GAO, 2006) and the 
employment of illegal immigrants by contractors at military installations (Witte, 2005, 
October 29). 
The Department of Defense has responded to some of this divergence in 
policy by attempting to supplement or substitute on-site human expertise using a 
variety of methods.  The first is to centralize, either on a national or regional basis, 
expertise in contracting or in a functional area, taking some responsibilities (and 
positions) away from individual installations.  For example, the Army Contracting 
Agency and Army Installations Agency have been established as “centers of 
excellence” to direct and assist with the provision of the appropriate services. 
The Department of the Navy has placed all shore installation-management 
activities under regional commanders (such as Commander Naval Region 
Southwest) who then may establish detachments, as tenant activities, at specific 
installations as the perceived need may justify.  Contracting itself has also been 
centralized in the Navy; for example, all contracts above the “simplified acquisition 
threshold” (usually meaning small purchases such as office supplies which are 
carried out locally using credit cards) are done by the Fleet and Industrial Supply 
Center (FISC) for that region.  For example, the FISC in San Diego serves all Navy 
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Another method used by the DoD is to “virtualize” expertise by creating Web-
based sites where published direction, documents such as “lessons learned” can be 
posted, or chat rooms can be hosted.  There are now a variety of such facilities in 
place.  While these initiatives may appear laudable, questions remain.  
Centralization and regionalization are convenient vehicles for budget cuts, with the 
side effect of removing financial management flexibility from installation 
commanders.  The authors did note, however, that the Air Force seems to be 
resisting this trend and that Wing Commanders at installations are retaining a 
traditionally broad range of responsibilities, personnel and budget under their chain 
of command. 
Notice that many types of services, and their contracts, do not lend 
themselves to codification or to asynchronous communication.  In such 
circumstances, the richness of face-to-face communication and the leveraging of 
experience acquired by long-serving government personnel can be diminished or 
lost if human capital is not carefully managed.  According to Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995), 
frequent dialogue and communication helps create a “common cognitive 
ground” among employees and thus facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
Since members of the organization share overlapping information, they can 
sense what others are struggling to articulate. 
The shift from explicit, clerical-like functions to complex activities requiring a 
much more significant component of judgment is well represented by two shifts: one 
being that the majority of DoD acquisition is now in services rather than goods, and 
the second being the emphasis on PBSA.  For example, the Air Force established a 
goal that at least half of all service acquisitions should be performance-based by 
2005 (Baldwin & Hunter, 2004).  Rendon (2005, Summer) has also commented that 
what was previously viewed simply as “purchasing” within the DoD has now evolved 
into a complex process that includes integrated supplier management, consideration 
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Yet a RAND study of the Army showed that the remaining civilian acquisition 
personnel were not being used “as effectively as they should be,” even with the 
recent loss of many military acquisition personnel to deployments (Hanks, C.H.,  
Axelband, E.I.,  Lindsay, S., Malik, M.R., & Steele, B.D. 2005).  The shift toward 
PBSA has significant implications for the government’s in-house capabilities to 
perform outsourcing, but how these implications will be dealt with remains an 
interesting area for further research. 
In its comprehensive review of the federal government’s outsourcing process, 
the Commercial Activities Panel, a congressionally chartered body chaired by the 
head of the GAO, emphasized that outsourcing policy be “consistent with human 
capital practices designed to attract, motivate, retain, and reward a high performing 
federal workforce.” Similarly, the Panel concluded, “the government faces continued 
and significant management, human resource, and professional development 
challenges, which affect the government’s ability to manage the cost, schedule, and 
performance of in-house and contracted activities” (GAO, 2002b).  A significant 
increase in the volume, cost and complexity of outsourced activity, declining 
numbers of experienced personnel, increased deployments, and widely rumored 
budget cuts do not point to a simple resolution of the challenges of contracting for 
services within the DoD.   
It is difficult in the best of times to undertake horizontal coordination between 
or within different agencies in Washington and translate them into improved cost-
effectiveness in the field. Yet the integration of strategic human planning with other 
functions has been identified as critical to achieving desired mission outcomes 
(GAO, 2005d; 2005e). The DoD must also remain an attractive customer for the 
best-performing businesses, and remain a “knowledgeable client” so it can continue 
to act as an effective steward of public funds. PBSA, in the words of a RAND study, 
requires the DoD to develop a “better understanding of how commercial firms do 
things” (Ausink, Camm & Cannon, 2001). Given the emerging environment, 
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V. Site Visits 
As part of this research, we visited two bases to collect information about their 
respective service acquisition processes:  the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and 
Travis Air Force Base.  We visited their facilities, interviewed their contracting 
officers and spoke with several among their contract customers.  Our impressions 
follow. 
A. Presidio of Monterey 
The Presidio of Monterey has a complex history.  Originally established as a 
fort (the Spanish meaning of “presidio”) under Spanish rule in 1770, POM began its 
life under the US flag as a garrison for Marines in 1846.  The site was inactive from 
1856 until 1902, and hosted a variety of Army units until its official closure in 1944.  
Military training in the Monterey area continued five miles north of the city at Fort Ord 
(established 1917)—at 28,000 acres one of the largest Army bases ever 
established.  Fort Ord operated as a basic and advanced combat training center and 
until its closure under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in 1994. 
After 1994, the POM continued to operate on its original 392 acres, which currently 
includes 180 buildings (Uslar, 2005).  While language training in Japanese began in 
secrecy at the dormant POM beginning a few months before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, in 1946 the site was officially reactivated as a foreign language training 
center, now known as the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 
(DLIFLC or informally DLI).  While DLI is part of the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), it has always had the mission of training military personnel 
from all of the military services.  Additionally, a small number of civil servants from 
the DoD and other federal agencies learn foreign languages at DLI, which graduates 
over 3,000 students annually in about 25 languages. While TRADOC is responsible 
for the funding and management of DLI, the functional sponsor is the Office of the 
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When Fort Ord closed in 1994, the Army began transferring segments of the 
base to a variety of entities.  A small portion of Fort Ord was retained for military use 
and designated as Ord Military Community (OMC).  OMC includes DoD offices, 
housing, community facilities, and notably some POM and DLI organizations that 
could no longer be accommodated on the original POM site, given the growth of DLI.  
Some support, such as transportation and recreation, is also provided by POM to 
other DoD installations in the Monterey area.  In a reversal of roles since the 1994 
BRAC action, OMC is now a “tenant activity” of POM, which provides all 
administrative support such as contracting (DLIFLC, 2006; Department of Toxic 
Substances Control, 2006; Presidio of Monterey, 2006). 
Since the closure of Fort Ord, the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, DLI has both changed its mission and begun to grow rapidly. 
The focus has changed from the languages of the Warsaw Pact to those of the 
Middle East and Asia.  In January 2006, DLI received additional funding of $362 
million from OSD to further enhance the quantity and quality of instruction of over 
200 classrooms and offices.  This includes reducing average class size, hiring over 
300 additional language instructors above the current complement of approximately 
900, as well as adding about 250 additional support staff.  A great deal of 
construction is also planned, extending until approximately 2012.  POM, whose 
physical facilities have developed in the haphazard manner so typical of military 
bases, will evolve into a more campus-like facility designed around DLI’s mission.  
Given the current expansion of POM and DLIFLC activity levels, a key challenge for 
both organizations will be agreeing on common levels of support and coordinating 
mission expansion and physical space requirements (Cairns, 2005, December 1; 
Howe, 2006, January 22). 
1. Contracting Organization 
Contracting for DLI and other activities supported by POM is provided by the 
Directorate of Contracting (DC), which falls under the POM Garrison Commander.  
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the DoD Center, a large building at OMC, which served as the medical center for the 
previous Fort Ord.  The DC is also functionally part of the Army Contracting Agency 
Southern Region (ACASR), headquartered at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, 
Texas.  DLI is the largest single entity supported by the DC; its needs tend to directly 
or indirectly influence the remainder of the contracting activity carried out by the DC. 
Furthermore, although DLI is the responsibility of TRADOC, POM and its 
associated physical infrastructure (land, roads, buildings, and utilities) is the 
responsibility of the Army’s Installation Management Agency (IMA) Southwest 
Region, also headquartered at Fort Sam Houston.  POM is also responsible for 
management of two training facilities: Fort Hunter Liggett and Camp Roberts, both 
located about 80 miles southeast of Monterey near Paso Robles. 
Accordingly, the DC has a number of reporting relationships within the DoD, 
in addition to dealing with private bidders and contractors.  Each of these 
relationships encompasses a specific mission, budgetary allocation, and regulatory 
framework.  Additionally, the funding and activity levels may not necessarily be 
coordinated.  The GAO has commented that among the services, the Army appears 
to have the greatest problem maintaining adequate levels of Base Operating 
Support (BOS) funding, which can potentially contribute “to the degradation of many 
installation facilities and can adversely affect the quality of life and morale of military 
personnel” (2005b). 
The above situation represents a challenge: the base’s mission (in this case, 
particularly language training) is growing rapidly but, for example, the IMA or ACA is 
not in a position to fund the additional contracting workload associated with that 
growth.  We discussed the challenges imposed by centralization of functional 
responsibilities within the different services previously.  In the case of POM, the 
GAO’s views on the subject may be particularly pertinent: 
Because the military services have often based future requirements estimates 
largely on prior expenditures, they do not necessarily know if BOS services 
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strategic plan for installations and have multiple actions under way to address 
these problems, but they have not synchronized varying time frames for 
accomplishing related tasks. Until these problems are resolved, DOD will not 
have the management and oversight framework in place for identifying total 
BOS requirements, providing Congress with a clear basis for making funding 
decisions, and ensuring adequate delivery of services. 
While the Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized installation management 
agencies can potentially create efficiencies and improve the management of 
the facilities through streamlining and consolidation, implementation of these 
plans has so far met with mixed results in quality and level of support 
provided to activities and installations. Until more experience yields 
perspective on their efforts to address the issues identified in this report, GAO 
is not in a position to determine whether the approach should be adopted by 
the other services. (2005b) 
One unique characteristic of the DC is its relationship with the two nearby 
cities of Monterey and Seaside.  It should be added that the legislation providing for 
the closure of Fort Ord in 1994 provided for a “demonstration project” (made 
permanent in 2003) that gave privileged contractor status, on a no-fee, cost-
reimbursement basis, to the Presidio Municipal Services Agency (PMSA) [originally 
known as the Joint Powers Authority (JPA)].  The PMSA is an inter-municipal 
consortium of the cities of Monterey and Seaside.  The first JPA contract was signed 
in 1997, and the current agreement under the PMSA has been described as follows: 
Under the expanded contract, which was signed in May 1999, the JPA 
maintains about 120 buildings at DLIFLC & POM and 35 buildings at the 
Annex. The buildings include such facilities as shopping malls, churches, a 
movie theatre, libraries, barracks, clubs, a sports center, and administrative 
buildings. As part of the contract, the building maintenance crews from the 
City of Monterey operate from facilities and shops at DLIFLC & POM, 
ensuring that support and services is immediately available.  
Competing against national, commercial businesses, the City of Monterey 
was again awarded the contract through a competitive bid process in 2001. 
The contract is priced at $18 million over a 5-year period. Fire services are 
now contracted separately […] and sewer maintenance is no longer part of 
the contract, as the City purchased the sewer system in July 2002. 
Through this partnership and contract, the Army has realized a 41% reduction 
in expenses when compared with previous base operation costs and private 
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costs, by installing photocell timers and HVAC controllers. Some $60,000 in 
energy costs alone have been saved annually for one building. (DLIFLC, 
2006) 
In 2000, the Army Audit Agency concluded that the use of PMSA had resulted 
in a 41% cost reduction compared to previous military and private services 
providers.  POM has explained that “the local municipalities have built-in incentives 
to reduce costs, improve techniques, and streamline procedures as they are using 
their resources up front until they are reimbursed” and that Monterey and Seaside 
are “non-profit agencies with reasonable general and administrative costs” with the 
necessary technical expertise in areas such as traffic engineering (2004, January 
24).   
During the 2005 BRAC hearings, the “Monterey model” was cited as an 
example of a technique for reducing BOS costs, and a number of adjoining 
communities proposed similar arrangements could be put in place to preserve their 
military installations.  It is of interest that the PMSA uses the services of both cities’ 
municipal workforces and also contracts with the private sector to carry out work on 
the POM and OMC sites.  Routine maintenance carried out by PMSA for the Army 
currently costs approximately $5.3 million in Fiscal Year 2004-2005 (Cairns, 2005, 
December 1).  The service supply chain model of the contracting arrangements at 












2. Contracting Activities 
The DC is responsible for managing 53 contracts involving approximately 500 
contracting actions (such as new contracts, renewals and amendments) annually, 
representing a total value of approximately $35 million—including $5.3 million 
contracted with PMSA (Cairns, 2005, December 1).   However, as described above, 
the creation of IMA and ACA have had a significant impact on the DC’s staff, which 
has declined from 80 to12.  Additionally, funding is often inadequate to cover 
contracts in force, and often is allocated by IMA or ACA on an incremental (less than 
yearly) basis 
Major contracts managed by the DC during FY2006 included grounds and 
other infrastructure maintenance (mainly through the PMSA), supply or gas and 
electricity, custodial (janitorial) services, food services (which use contractor 
personnel in two POM dining halls), maintenance and dispatching of the motor pool 
(including buses), audio visual and IT services in support of the instructional mission, 
and fire protection for the POM from the City of Monterey, which is not covered by 
the PMSA. 
For each contract, monitoring of contractor performance is the responsibility 
of the POM, DLI or other organization that benefits from the contractor’s services.  
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reported to the DC by government employees within the Directorate of Public Works.  
These personnel are known by various titles such as “technical personnel” or “quality 
assurance evaluators.”  
Efforts are underway to improve and standardize the training of these staff 
members so they can carry out their duties in a consistent manner and ensure that 
the DC has the proper information on contractor performance in exercising its 
oversight responsibilities on behalf of the government.  These initiatives are 
particularly important given the shortage of contracting staff.  A related initiative by 
the DC to deal with the staffing problem is to reduce the total number of contracts 
through consolidation, which has a major impact on the administrative workload of 
both DC and user-organization personnel. 
We found POM staff to be highly conscious of their role in supporting the 
mission, notably DLI’s rapidly expanding instructional activities.  However, there is 
concern about the long-term ability of POM to provide an acceptable level of service 
to DLI given the significant staff reduction.  The problems can be deceivingly subtle.  
For example, we mentioned previously that DLI has received significant funding from 
the OSD to improve the quality of instruction and the production of qualified linguists.  
However, much of the supporting infrastructure for this initiative will be provided 
through contracts.  Requirements determination, market research, tendering, 
evaluation of proposals, correspondence with bidders, bid evaluation, contract 
award, and contract monitoring all require a variety of qualified personnel who may 
not currently be available.  Additionally, agencies such as IMA, ACA or TRADOC 
may view DLI’s expansion as an OSD-directed initiative that does not necessarily 
commit those organizations to assisting POM. 
B. Travis Air Force Base 
Travis Air Force Base is located approximately 50 miles northeast of San 
Francisco.  Travis can be considered a small city unto itself, complete with airport, 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 40- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Base, Travis is home to the 60th Air Mobility Wing (AMW), which is the largest air 
mobility organization in the Air Force.  Flying the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft 
and the KC-10 Extender tanker aircraft, the 60th AMW fulfills its mission of Global 
Reach and flying support and humanitarian airlift missions anywhere in the world.  
Travis is also home to the David Grant Medical Center, the second largest medical 
treatment facility in the Air Force.   
1. Contracting Support 
Providing contracting support to Travis Air Force Base is the mission of the 
60th Contract Squadron (CONS). The 60th CONS awards and administers over 
$320 million annually in contracts for construction, supplies, and services (US Air 
Force, 2006).   
In terms of services contracts, the 60th CONS manages service contracts that 
are traditionally found at most Air Force bases.  These services include grounds 
maintenance, food services, custodial, and military family housing maintenance.  
Due to the unique mobility mission of Travis AFB and the medical mission of the 
adjacent David Grant Medical Center, the contracting squadron also manages some 
specialized services contracts such as passenger terminal screening, professional 
medical staffing services, and falconry services. 
2. Services Contracts 
Travis AFB contracts with Pride Industries for many labor-intensive service 
contracts such as grounds maintenance, food services, custodial, and military family 
housing maintenance.  Pride Industries is also the contractor for the passenger 
terminal operations and pre-board screening.  It is “the nation's largest employer of 
people with disabilities and provides a variety of outsourcing solutions to meet the 
manufacturing and service needs of companies nationwide” (Pride Industries).  
These contracts are based on a Firm Fixed-price (FFP) basis and use predominantly 
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the contractor complying with specific government requirements specified in the 
Statement of Work (SOW).  
In supporting the David Grant Medical Center, Travis uses performance-
based service contracts for nursing personnel supply, intensive care unit (ICU) 
services, natal services, and pediatric care.  Performance-based service contracts 
are designed to focus on the desirable performance results, including specific 
measurable objectives, and quality assurance plan to ensure that contract 
requirements are met or exceeded (Garrett & Rendon, 2005).  Performance-based 
service contracts are based on a Statement of Objectives (SOO) developed by the 
government, included in the government’s solicitation or Request for Proposal 
(RFP).  The SOO identifies the end-results or desired performance results of the 
contract. 
3. Organizational Processes and Tools 
The 60th Contracting Squadron interfaces with the base organizations that 
own or manage the required service.  For example, the 60th Civil Engineering 
Squadron owns the requirement for the grounds maintenance, custodial, and military 
family housing maintenance services.  The Services Squadron owns the 
requirement for the food services, and the Medical Center owns the requirement for 
the medical services.  These requirement owners represent the users for these 
specific services and, thus, are responsible for developing the Statement of 
Objective (SOO) or Performance Work Statement (PWS), Quality Assurance 
Surveillance Plan (QASP), and for the actual surveillance of the contractor’s 
performance.   
As the organization providing contracts support the requirement owners, the 
Contracting Squadron meets periodically with the functional managers and QAEs of 
those organizations to discuss any critical issues that may result in modifications to 
the contract Statement of Work or Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.  Proactive 
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Travis AFB uses Business Requirement Advisory Groups (BRAGs) as the 
mechanism for conducting these communications.  BRAGs are teams made up of 
cross-functional personnel that represent the functional organizations involved in the 
services contracts.  These cross-functional teams plan and manage the service 
contracts throughout the service’s lifecycle, including the market research, 
requirements determination, procurement planning and solicitation planning, as well 
as determining the performance surveillance strategy for the contract. 
Each requirement organization provides Quality Assurance Evaluators 
(QAEs) for controlling and managing the contractor’s performance.  The QAEs are 
considered functional experts within their specific function (grounds maintenance, 
custodial, housing maintenance, food services, medical services, etc.) and are 
responsible for ensuring the contractor meets the requirement of the contract.  The 
Contracting Squadron provides training to the QAEs and manages the base-wide 
Quality Assurance program.  The contractor uses the Performance Work Statement 
to ensure that it meets the performance objectives of the respective Statement of 
Objective.  The Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan provides the Quality Assurance 
Evaluator with an effective tool for surveying the contractor’s performance.  These 
surveillance tools include random sampling, 100-percent inspection, and periodic 
surveillance (Rendon, 2001).  The QASP is used to ensure that the government 
receives acceptable contractor performance as compared to the technical 
requirements of the contract. 
C. Naval Postgraduate School 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was established in Monterey, CA, in 
1952.  Along with the US Naval Academy and the Naval War College, NPS is often 
referred to as one of the Navy’s “flagship” educational institutions.  NPS awards 
accredited graduate degrees and offers short courses as well as distance-learning 
programs.  Current full-time enrolment is approximately 1,800.  Students are military 
officers from all five US armed services, US government employees, and officers 
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NPS, like the Presidio of Monterey (POM), faces the challenge of determining 
the most effective manner in which to organize a complex educational mission while 
ensuring that adequate support for its physical facilities is in place, including service 
contracts.   Following the closure of the nearby Fort Ord in 1991 (discussed in the 
previous section on POM), and the near-demise of NPS during the 1995 Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process, the School has undergone 
numerous changes in organizational structure and budgetary responsibilities, which 
have, in turn, significantly changed how service contracts are defined, competed and 
administered. 
However, NPS and POM have not evolved toward shared support services, 
with a few minor exceptions such as medical care and military housing.  Also unlike 
POM, NPS has not developed any innovative partnerships with the City of Monterey, 
although refuse collection and tree-trimming are provided to NPS by the City on a 
routine contractual basis. 
Before the BRAC decision in 2005 to keep NPS open, the School’s mission 
and functions were carried out in an essentially unitary style, much like a typical Air 
Force Base.  Support activities, military personnel and civilian staff were the 
responsibility of the NPS President and (on a more frequent basis) the Chief of Staff, 
while the Provost (who is appointed by and responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, 
not the NPS President) had (and retains) authority over academic matters and 
faculty personnel issues. 
Beginning in 2005, the Navy began to modify its installation management and 
contracting activities in order to reduce overhead costs and redirect notional savings 
toward operations.  This was primarily achieved by separating mission from support 
functions, and then transferring responsibility to regional or national organizations 
that would provide the same services on a consolidated basis, assumedly ensuring a 
more uniform service level with fewer acquisition and acquisition-related personnel, 
consolidated service contracts covering a larger number of installations, and with the 
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The above changes had little impact on service contracting in support of the 
academic mission, which was left within the purview of NPS.  However, the NPS 
Supply Department was closed and all acquisition above the “micropurchase” (i.e., 
credit card) limit of $2500 is now conducted by the Fleet and Industrial Supply 
Center San Diego (FISC-SD).  Purchasing agents in academic departments as well 
as the NPS Research Office now route their requisitions through FISC-SD, which is 
responsible for all Navy installations in California and Nevada. 
Additionally, support functions such as facilities management and grounds 
maintenance, police, civilian human resources, legal services and public affairs were 
transferred from NPS to a new entity, Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM).  
NSDM functions as a local detachment of the Commander Naval Region Southwest 
(CNRSW), who is now considered the “landlord” for NPS and all other Navy units in 
the Monterey area.  CNRSW, in turn, reports to the Commander Navy Installations 
Command (CNIC), a position established to “enable the Navy's Operating Concept 
through Enterprise alignment of all shore installation support to the Fleet, Fighter 
and Family” (see http://www.cni.navy.mil/cnic_hq_site/AboutCNIC/index.htm).   
NSDM has a limited contracting capability, with four contracting officer positions that 
carry out contracting for the above functions, particularly facilities management and 
construction.  Larger construction contracts are issued by the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command Southwest (NAVFAC Southwest) in San Diego, with local 
inspection and other liaison activities carried out by NSDM personnel, who absorbed 
the former NPS “Public Works” (facilities and grounds management) role. 
In early 2006, further changes were made that added to the fragmentation of 
service contracting responsibilities in the Monterey area.  The remaining supply-
related activities under NSDM were transferred to FISC-SD as part of a further 
regionalization initiative.  Similarly, the NSDM Public Works organization became the 
Monterey detachment of NAVFAC Southwest.  Finally, CNRSW currently plans to 
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Southwest over the next few years.  These are the largest ($1.2 million and 
$614,000 respectively) service contracts now administered by NSDM. 
In summary, Navy units in the Monterey area, of which NPS and the Fleet 
Numerical Meteorological and Oceanographic Center are the largest, are now 
considered “tenant activities” of their new landlord, CNRSW.  Further complexity has 
been added by centralization of service contracting at FISC-SW and the 
replacement of the locally managed Public Works functions by NAVFAC 
detachments. 
This challenging mix of organizational structures, comparable in some ways 
to the one now faced by POM, raises the issue of congruency in managerial 
decisions, budget allocation, and coherence of support vs. mission needs.  A final 
comment relates to the stewardship of NPS’ academic mission, which has changed 
from being located in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in 
Washington to the Naval Education and Training Command in Pensacola, FL, the 
latter being an organization that administers a large array of training and education 
facilities and has little expertise in graduate education.  Notably, the US Naval 
Academy is exempt from NETC oversight and continues to report to OPNAV, as did 
NPS in the past.  It should be noted that NETC is currently being restructured and 
may become integrated into OPNAV.  However, NPS appears to lack the clear 
“mission sponsor” role (which includes significant, dedicated funding) played by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in the case of the Defense Language 
Institute, and by extension, POM.  How the various Navy and Army organizations in 
the Monterey area will continue to evolve their reporting relationships and 
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VI. Conclusions 
We want to underscore that this is exploratory research in Service Supply 
Chain in the Department of Defense.  Consequently, the research observations and 
conclusions listed below are somewhat preliminary in nature, and should be viewed 
as such. 
1. The Department of Defense’s services acquisition volume has 
continued to increase in scope and dollars in the past decade. The 
GAO found that since FY 1999, the DoD’s spending on services has 
increased by 66%, and in FY 2003, the DoD spent over $118 billion—
or approximately 57% of total DoD procurement dollars—on services 
(GAO, 2005a).  The DoD procures a variety of services, including both 
the traditional commercial service and services unique to defense.  In 
terms of amount spent, four service categories represent over 50% of 
total spending on services: (a) professional, administrative, and 
management support services, (b) construction, repair and 
maintenance of structure and facilities, (c) equipment maintenance, 
and (d) information technology services. 
2. Presidio of Monterey (POM) has contracted maintenance of about 155 
buildings and structures to Presidio Municipal Services Agency 
(PMSA), a consortium of the cities of Monterey and Seaside.  The 
PMSA agreement has allowed the two cities to apply their expertise to 
routine municipal services, and the Army to focus on its military 
mission. Through this partnership and contract with PMSA, the POM 
has realized a 41% reduction in expenses when compared with 
previous base operation costs and private contracts.  We recommend 
the DoD explore and evaluate the possibility of establishing such 
synergistic contractual relations with cities adjacent to other bases in 
supporting of their respective operations. 
3. Proactive and frequent communications are essential for a successful 
services contract.  We found a successful example of this at Travis 
AFB, where 60th CONS uses BRAGs as the mechanism for conducting 
such communications. Business Requirement Advisory Groups 
(BRAGs) are teams made up of cross-functional personnel that 
represent the functional organizations involved as customers in the 
services contracts.  These cross-functional teams plan and manage 
the service contracts throughout the service’s lifecycle.  As the DoD 
increases the use of centralized contracting organizations and regional 
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even more essential for the successful management and performance 
of these contracts.   
4. Our visits and interviews at Travis AFB, Presidio of Monterey (POM), 
and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM) confirmed the 
GAO’s finding that, “while the Army’s and Navy’s creation of 
centralized installation management agencies can potentially create 
efficiencies and improve the management of the facilities through 
streamlining and consolidation, implementation of these plans has so 
far met with mixed results in quality and level of support provided to 
activities and installations” (GAO, 2005b). 
5. The centralization of contracting offices and use of regional contracts 
will result in additional dynamics to the DoD’s acquisition of services.  
The use of centralized contracting organizations and regional contracts 
will require even more proactive and frequent communications 
between the contracting organization and the customer.  Although it is 
still too early to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of centralized 
contracting organizations and regional contracts, this research has 
indicated that centralization and regionalization of services contracts 
are growing trends in the DoD, and will significantly change how 
services contracts are managed. 
6. Given the unique characteristics of services, such as intangibility, co-
production, diversity and complexity, establishing service specifications 
and measuring and monitoring the quality of delivered service is 
inherently more complex than that in manufactured goods.  Hence, it is 
critical to have onboard a “knowledgeable client” and the necessary 
number of skilled contracting personnel to define the requirements and 
to supervise outsourced services.  The DoD has been aggressively 
complying with OMB’s Circular A-76, which directs all federal 
government agencies “to rely on the private sector for needed 
commercial activities.”  This has resulted in dramatic growth in the 
DoD’s spending while downsizing the DoD civilian and military 
acquisition workforce.  Although this exploratory study is not yet 
completed, we believe that the above two trends contradict the critical 
need to have onboard a necessary number of skilled contracting 
personnel.  This could mean that in the DoD’s outsourced services, 
either the needs are not being fully satisfied, or the value for the money 
spent is not being realized. 
7. Although the DoD acquires more services than goods, and the 
acquisition of services and the use of service contractors are becoming 
an increasingly critical aspect of the DoD mission, the management 
infrastructure for the acquisition of services is less developed than for 
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program management approach and lifecycle methodology for the 
acquisition of services, which is confirmed by the lack of 
standardization in the business practices associated with the services 
acquisition process.  This results from the fact that the functional 
personnel currently managing the services programs are not 
considered members of the DoD acquisition workforce, and are 
typically not provided acquisition training under Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) requirements.  
A. Discussion 
The establishment of centralized contracting organizations and the use of 
regional service contracts were identified in this research as a current trend in the 
DoD’s approach to services acquisition.  With the drawdown of the defense 
workforce and the consolidation of military installations, the defense department is 
attempting to achieve cost efficiencies by centralizing contracting organizations and 
awarding regional contracts for some base-support services.   
An example of a centralized contracting organization includes the Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Center San Diego (FISCSD).  FISC San Diego’s regional contracts 
department provides a full range of acquisition and contracting support to all CONUS 
Navy installations west of the Mississippi River, unless otherwise assigned (FISC 
San Diego website).  Although the services being acquired are performed at 
geographically separated locations, in this case CONUS Navy installations west of 
the Mississippi River, the contracting support for these contracts (Procuring 
Contracting Officers and contract administrators) are centrally located at FISC San 
Diego.   
An example of a regional service contract includes a single contract awarded 
by the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to Phoenix Management, Inc., for base 
logistics services at six military installations—Peterson AFB Colorado (including 
Schriever AFB and Cheyenne Mountain), FE Warren AFB, Wyoming, Malmstrom 
AFB, Montana, and Vandenberg AFB, California.  Although the logistics services will 
be provided at each of these six locations, only one contract source selection was 
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contracting office.  It is also assumed that this logistics services contract will be 
centrally controlled at AFSPC Headquarters, but de-centrally executed at each of the 
military installations (Phoenix Management, Inc., website)  
The centralization of contracting offices and use of regional contracts will 
result in additional dynamics to the acquisition of services.  The advantages of 
centralized contracting offices include better control of contracting operations, the 
development of consistent and standardized services requirements, and a 
decreased contract-management workforce.  Disadvantages of centralized 
contracting organizations include physical separation from the customer and the 
potential of being non-responsive to the customer’s requirements.  For example, if 
the commander of a military installation has concerns or issues with the quality of 
the contractor’s performance, the commander will typically have to contact the 
contracting organization—which is not only geographically separated from the 
commander’s installation, but may not consider the contractor’s performance a 
critical priority.    
The use of regional contracts provides the contracting organization with a 
means of applying a strategic approach to the acquisition of services.  The 
advantages of regional contracts include ensuring and maintaining standardized 
services requirements at multiple military installations, leveraging the buying power 
of the buying organization, and reducing the number of contracts and contractors 
managed by the contracting organization.  The disadvantages of regionalized 
contracts include contracts  that do not address the unique needs of each of the 
military installations.  For example, a regional grounds maintenance contract may 
not meet the unique mission needs of a military installation with flight operations if 
the other military installations under that contract do not have a flight-operations 
mission.  Another example would be a regional custodial services contract for a 
group of military installations, some with 24-hour flight or training operations and 
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